James has a keen interest in military history, backed with experience as a TA reservist and a 17th century re-enactor. He has designed and run several face to face social games and is the editor of MilMud, the journal of the CLWG game design group. He is currently working on a book on the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution.
I borrowed this from the library and liked it so much that I bought my own copy. I found it very interesting because it is unusual for an other rank to write a memoir. Especially one where the author was a battery sergeant major who also had access to the battery clerk’s notes. So, much of the 1944-45 campaign is very well documented with grid references for gun positions, ammo expenditure and times of moves. It is a fantastic reference book for WW2 operations of a Royal Horse Artillery battery in self propelled guns.
There is also some of the human element to it as well. I was especially moved by the mystery of Gunner E T Jones who disappeared in the middle of a battle between the authors casualty evacuation runs. Gunner Jones was never found and is commemorated on the memorial for the missing at Bayeux.
It has a Fab Concept. However it doesn’t quite work. Some of it is too heavy handed and not well enough researched to be credible.
I bought this book because I liked the premise, a change in the nature of warfare brought about by better information available to the whole army through a wiki style network. It has promise for some very interesting stories, but the author instead wrote a political polemic based on very old fashioned stereotypes and without bothering to do his research.
Accepting that our narrator is probably unreliable, given he is definitely going insane, and the twist that happens at the end (no spoilers) it is clear that we cannot rely on him. However there are bits of his prior experience with the British Army that just don’t work for me (having been in the TA from 1989-1992 and knowing a fair number of current and recently ex-service personnel).
The primary character is supposed to have served in the British Army for a few months before deserting because he didn’t like the extreme discipline. This itself is fair enough, a few months would see a soldier through basic training and into the specialist training for their arm of service. This is the period when the most discipline is imposed. All through the book the success of the new model armies is based on the rigid inflexibility of traditional forces that cannot think for themselves. This is the bit I find most difficult to swallow, even back in the 1980s soldiers were being taught to solve problems and work through gaps in information and orders, especially regulars that were deployed to Northern Ireland. By the current period, with the huge increase in peacekeeping operations and the small insurgencies thinking is a core skill for all ranks, not just senior officers. The stereotype might have been true for the 1950s conscripts, but even then I doubt it.
This is not my only problem with the book though. While it is clear that the author can write decent prose, there is still not a whole lot of thinking going on about the consequences of how the technology changes things. There is some in there, but not enough. For example why didn’t the British Army just turn on massive jammers of the wifi signal when they came up against the NMAs? Also why are the NMA better on a man for man basis when they are largely untrained volunteers up against properly trained soldiers in a veteran army? I can get local superiority allowing them to win battles, but in an exchange of fire I don’t see how wiki info turns people into better shots.
Anyway, the book is riddled with holes and could have been edited into a crisper better book. Unfortunately it wasn’t.
This was the first time I have read a prisoner of war story involving Germans as the POWs, apart from having read the official history of British Intelligence in WW2 (which only dealt with the captured German spies). I have, however read lots about the prisoners of the Germans.
It was interesting that security in British camps seems to have been quite lax. Despite many apparently successful German breakouts there is only one well known instance of a German POW making a home run. This book comes across as having been well researched where it comes to its primary subject matter, although there is quite a lot of preamble with a summary of how WW2 went which is not as well researched as the main subject. This lets it down for those well versed in WW2 history.
Once the preamble is done there is a specific history of the camp in Devizes that is obviously the author’s initial exposure to the story that he decided to write about. There is a lot of original research included where the author has spoken to locals about the camp before researching it in the national archives. The story follows the efforts of the British authorities to keep control in the last year of the war when prisoner numbers increased dramatically.
The German POWs were graded according to their sympathies to the Nazis, the believers being black, the anti-Nazis being white and the majority Grey. The camps were initially mixed, and the Nazis outnumbered the anti-nazis. This meant that the camps were run by the Nazis and had a hostile tone for those Germans that had worked out how the war was going to end.
After a riot in Devizes a number of the POWs were transferred to a camp in Scotland. When they got there some of the hardliners decided that some of their fellow POWs weren’t ardent enough Nazis. This came to a head with the lynching of a German prisoner who was accused of collaboration with the British.
This is an excellent history of a small unit action set in the wider context of the war, and well explained for those not steeped in military history or the second world war.
The author starts with setting the background, explaining the grand sweep of the war and the events that lead to the formation of the commandos in mid-1940 and then a high-level overview of the commando training and the early operations so that you understand what commandos are all about, and the strategic context that lead to the assault on Dieppe in late summer 1942.
The build up to the attack is well covered, based heavily on the account by the embedded journalist that accompanied 4 Commando. After that the assault narrative splits into two, one for each of the groups that landed, and based on a mixture of accounts and interviews with various survivors of the operation.
This is more than just an infantry officer’s memoir. Denis Forman was closely involved in the Battle School movement that transformed the British Army’s infantry training during the second world war. He then went on to serve alongside Lionel Wigram (the primary proponent and intellectual leader of the Battle School movement) in Italy. The story is as much about Lionel Wigram as it is about Denis Forman himself.
However one of the stand out pieces for me is the honest treatment of how men deal with battle. The psychological impact and how unreliable things become is often not mentioned in most memoirs, there is an unspoken need not to embarrass anyone, or bring up things better left to lie. This book manages to discuss it without shaming anyone.
Also, the appendices have copies of the reports into the lessons from the Sicily campaign drawn by Lionel Wigram. Not published at the time because they were too controversial they tell an interesting story of how the theory met reality.
Just before the war started Denis Forman graduated from Pembroke College, Cambridge in 1939. He was certain that there was going to be a war but didn’t want to commit himself to the Army until it started, so he took a short-term post with a shipping agency to avoid being sent to the Far East to make his fortune (which is where he was being directed by his elders). When war broke out he was in the Netherlands, and he returned to join the Argylls where he was promptly sent off to be an officer cadet.
His description of joining an infantry battalion and his efforts as a subaltern within it are priceless. He honestly shows how desperate the British Army was in the Summer of 1940 and how it was manning (and ‘leading’) its infantry battalions. More than enough to make you wonder about what would have happened if the Germans had invaded (although I like to believe that they probably had some very similar issues).
This is a campaign history written by a veteran of 5th Bn Black Watch who later became the secretary of the Highland Division Association. Direct personal accounts, both from the author and other veterans, are used to tell the story of the 51st Highland Division in a very personal way. This book offers some new perspectives on the battles of the 51st, especially those in the final months of the war in which the author was personally involved.
I actually enjoyed reading this book, even though it wasn’t the book that I thought I was buying. I had ordered it expecting that it would tell me about the various special forces missions that UK forces had been up to between the first Gulf War in 1990-91 and when it was published (in 2004).
It sort of covered that, but there was no real detail to much of the early stuff, for example the Sierra Leone mission is dealt with in a couple of pages. I’ve seen some other (much more detailed) accounts of the events (from the point of view of the Paras and the kidnapped Major).
However, where it does come into its own is when it explains the issues around Kosovo and Macedonia. The author obviously had a strong interest in this period (possibly based on working there as a journalist) and had clearly spoken to several involved parties (or done some very good research). The writing style is very easy to read, clearly articulates the issues and the motivations of the various parties and also explains the background to the situations very well. You get a lot of the flavour of the conflict and the terror of villagers in the Balkans from the book. It also explains some of the behind the scenes bits that the NATO forces were involved in (not just SF types, others as well). In fact if the book had been billed as an in-depth look at Kosovo and Macedonian conflict in 1999-2004 then it would perhaps have been more honest (although perhaps with fewer sales).
There is a reasonable treatment of the early Afghanistan operations, although there wasn’t apparently much going on there from a British point of view up to 2004 (we got heavily involved in 2006, two years after the book was first published). It also covers the effect on the SAS of the expansion in operations since 9/11 and also the Iraq war (which is part of the proof that the author has spoken to some of the SF community or those closely connected to it as he knew in 2004 of the impending manpower crisis that the explosion in PMC work in Iraq caused).
One of the more interesting bits is a speculative section near the end on what an operation to capture Radovan Karadzic might look like and who it might involve. This was the sort of thing that you might expect from a book about special forces missions (albeit non-speculative narratives of actual missions based on interviews with those involved).
Overall, if you are interested in the Balkans conflicts this is well worth reading, although perhaps shorter on that than a dedicated book might be.
Shortly after lunchtime (when I ate my lunch, megagames don’t have breaks, they run continuously until the end) I changed role. The trigger for this was that the Emergency Services didn’t really need two players (and Geoff had clearly got the hang of megagames even though it was his first time). Also Federal assistance was invoked, and there wasn’t a player team at Federal level (because it was always uncertain if it would be required and carried too much risk of boredom to be staffed before it was required).
Combat Service Identification Badge of the 101st Airborne Division (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
So I ended up as a Major General in charge of the 101st Airborne Division and in command of the Federalised State National Guard forces. I also had a special forces team attached. The direct Federal team was lead by a (female) Presidential Envoy who had a direct line to the White House and was told to get the situation under control. Me and the Special Forces Colonel were the other two players in this team, although effectively I had all the National Guard players in my team too.
First steps were to work out a containment plan to stop this spreading, and then to deal with rules of engagement for the soldiers under my command. I observed that what we were dealing with were (virus infected) US Citizens on US soil and that just shooting them all wasn’t an acceptable position. I also observed that preventing innocent citizens from leaving an area could be seen as an unlawful arrest without charge, and was effectively suspending habeas corpus. What we really needed was an appropriate Executive Order to ensure that none of my soldiers could be held liable for civil action. It turned out White House counsel agreed, and I got the following as my rules of engagement (endorsed by the Deputy Attorney General)
Within the specified area all US Military forces are authorised to use reasonable force to detain people within the specified area and to direct them to appropriate medical and/or containment facilities.
Lethal force is authorised to prevent people leaving the specified area, or where they refuse to obey clear instructions to go to a medical or containment facility. Before opening fire at least THREE WARNINGS of “ARMY! HALT OR I FIRE!” (or similar words to the same effect) must be given. Only individual small arms, firing single, aimed shots may be used. Artillery, rockets, bombs or other explosive weapons are not authorised for use unless on the direct express order of a Colonel or more senior officer.
[– end ROE –]
This, however, was only the first of the philosophical discussions that I was involved in. Like all good generals, mine was a political game, not one of issuing orders (although I did some of that too, largely by giving mission objectives to the National Guard General and the SF Colonel). So I made sure that not only the military, but also the political and police players knew what our ROE were and our intent to cordon a wide area before moving in to eradicate the problem. However I was careful to deploy some regular troops to Romero City so that we could truthfully state that we were directly assisting the city authorities and that we were providing humanitarian aid to those made refugees by the outbreak.
Other Player Viewpoints
If you want to read what other players in this game thought about it then here are some more links:
The Urban Nightmare megagame, is a political crisis management game of a zombie outbreak in Romero City. I played the Deputy Chief of the Emergency Services. (A combined paramedic and firefighter service). We had 20 fire appliances and 8 emergency ambulances to service the city. During the megagame I posted tweets of what we were doing, remembering not to start talking about zombies at any point. This was my attempt to keep it realistic. It meant that some of our decisions weren’t optimal for the zombie apocalypse. They did make sense for major emergencies though.
The Start of Urban Nightmare
Overnight we’ve had four emergency calls for paramedics at Sin Street, Cass Tech High School, Elmwood Park & the Water-works Park. All four incidents have had their casualties taken to City General Hospital (which is the closest).
Live Tweets from Urban Nightmare
I live tweeted during the megagame (until it overwhelmed us, see pt.2 for my follow on role)
Overnight 4 paramedic calls. Sin Street, Cass Tech High School, Elmwood Park & the Water-works Park. #megagame#zombies
In the Face of the Enemy: A Battery Sergeant Major in Action in the Second World War by Ernest A. Powdrill
