We have moved up into a line between the coastal marshes at DIXMUDE to LILLE. Two corps of the German First Army are on our Right flank and we intend to attack them in the flank. We believe that they have extended lines of supply.
There is a gap between our right flank and the French left. This presents a risk to our troops.
A planned attack towards Tournai / Valenciennes is in progress with a deep recon by the Cav (to disorganize German Supply). Talks with the Belgiums have revealed that they are attacking out of Antwerp as well.
The BEF counters are finally on the map at the beginning of September as they are almost in contact with the enemy, in a secondary defensive line. The Belgians were having a rough time of it and the Germans have battered the Belgian Army almost out of existence.
Although noted in the report to the War Office by the players the fact that there was a gap between them and the French 6th Army they were more concerned about dealing the German 1st Army‘s Left Wing (shown in the middle bottom of the map photo) a decisive blow from the flank.
The Belgian Army is falling back westwards towards TOURNAI, LILLE and GHENT. The Belgian right flank has been badly hammered by German First Army and the Belgians retired to LILLE. German First Army are at SOIGNES advancing West.
We have moved up into a reserve position in the line between LILLE and VALENCIENNES. III Corps and the Artillery are concentrated at ARRAS.
In conjunction with the Belgians the BEF will move to left along the riverline MENIN-GHENT with a fallback position at YPRES-DIXMUDE. The right will remain at LILLE, III Corps will move into the Centre. This will lock our left on the coast. I intend to fight a defensive battle to inflict maximum casualties on the Germans and stop them. If pressed we will trade space and avoid casualties.
Concern is German breakthrough moving through CHARLEROI towards MAUBERGE. The French have undertaken cover that possibility and our right flank.
Team Control gloss
The BEF counters are deliberately not on the map so as to hide their location until the point when they will be in contact with the enemy. This was intended to give some uncertainty to the Germans on where they appeared as the players had the freedom to depart from the historical deployments of the BEF.
The first turn of this megagame covered the first three weeks of August 1914. During this turn the British decided on their plan (K) and mobilised the BEF to France.
British Strategic Discussions
There were three plans considered. Plan F was a landing at Ostend to directly support the Belgians; Plan K landing in France and joining battle in Belgium to the left of the French Armies; and Plan W which had the same landing as Plan K but supported the French on their border with Germany.
Plan F was ruled out as too close to the likely focus of a German attack and if the Belgians overwhelmed there is a very high risk of being cut off and having to conduct an emergency evacuation. The consequence of this would be many casualties and the risk of the BEF as a force in being with an evacuation under egregious conditions.
Plan W was not recommended because both flanks would be under control of the French Army whcih would be a risk that we need to conform to their plans rather than act independently as directed by the War Office. Additionally we would not have a secure flank.
Plan K was recommended because it keeps us with a close link to the channel ports, allows independent operation of the BEF and allows us time to find the Germans and engage them on our own terms. Base at ROUEN and railhead at BAPAUME. We will have a secure flank and gives the option of supporting the Belgians and keep contact with the French.
This was approved by the War Cabinet.
Turn 1 umpire map
BEF Report to the War Office 23rd August 1914
Concentration movements successful, left flank consisting of I Corps & Cav Divn is at ARRAS. Right Flank with II Corps at CAMBRAI. BEF HQ is at PERONNE.
We intend to advance through LENS to the East of LILLE. Both Corps will maintain contact. The right flank will rest on VALENCIENNES with the left on LILLE. Cavalry Division will carry out forward recconaissance towards GHENT. RFC will carry out air recconaissance towards BRUSSELS.
We are expecting III Corps and the Heavy Artillery to concentrate at ARRAS.
Information has been received from the French press that British troops have been reported, we would like the War Office to liaise to ask the French not to report British troop movements in the press.
Team Control gloss
After the players complained about the reports of their movements in the French press the Foreign Office lodged a protest about the egregious breach of operational security and asked the French to censor future reports.
At this stage the BEF was doing some liaison with the French, who were initially reluctant to provide them with enough rail transport to move their entire force, but this was overcome when the matter was escalated to command level.
Later today I will be the British Team Control for the Megagame Makers Iron Dice game of the opening moves of WW1. Here’s the blurb from the Megagame Maker‘s website.
Megagame Makers are marking the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War with IRON DICE, a high-level operational megagame by Jon Casey (designer of Home Before the Leaves Fall).
Players will be a member of a national High Command, an Army Commander or staff officer.
Megagames are an immersive experience, and there are no breaks in them when they start, but if I can I intend to try and record the reports that the British team send to the War Office at the end of each turn. Possibly these will be uploaded during the day, but that depends on wifi/data signal and time. If not then you’ll see them over the next few days as I find time to retroactively update them.
I make a point of reading first hand accounts of special forces operations. I started with world war two tales of the SAS and have worked up to the present time. Since the Bravo Two Zero fiasco I don’t expect much from tales of recent events.
This particular book tells the tale of a Special Boat Service mission in Iraq in 2003. It suffers a bit from excessive hypebole, presumably to garner sales. However it is actually very readable, and although much of the outcome is telepgrahed in advance the way it’s done is through a good hook to keep you reading to find out the detail of how/what happens. Well before all the debates in Parliament in 2003 M Squadron SBS were training up for their mission, changing their role from maritime operations to being vehicle borne. They then went into Iraq just before the air war started in 2003 with an attempt to contact a major Iraqui army formation to persuade it to surrender.
You know when you start to read it that the mission isn’t going to go well. In fact without even knowing anything about it I picked up that it must have gone horribly wrong. However I also knew that it couldn’t have gone that far wrong, because otherwise I probably would have heard about it since I have an interest in current affairs and military operations.
The story follows the perspective of one SBS Sergeant who was the lead navigator for most of the mission. Mainly it focusses on what he sees, and the actions of his three man vehicle crew. On the whole it is an interesting narrative and it gripped me enough to read longer than I normally do.
There’s a clear thread running through it of the forebodings, that may well have been how the central character felt, but are laboured to the extent that it comes across as 20:20 hindsight. There are also some rather strained references to Bravo Two Zero and the similarities with that patrol (both seem to have been compromised because they refused to shoot a child goat herder). That doesn’t really wash with me because the goat incident in Bravo Two Zero wasn’t repeated in the other books about the patrol and The Real “Bravo Two Zero” gives another version of events (apparently two Iraqui veterans of the Iran-Iraq War spotted the patrol, not a child goat herder).
Despite this I still think it’s worth a read, especially if you get it for the knock down price of 99p as I did.
Further to the previous post Faith in Morale I’ve tried to synthesize the varioius readings on military psychology into a set of morale rules that might give a realistic ebb and flow to an engagement. I’ve not had a chance to test these yet, but here’s what the chart looks like.
v01 of the 2D Morale Chart, (c) 2014 James Kemp
Reading through the various OR type publications it seems to me that morale is affected by proximity to both friends and the enemy. The closer solders get to the enemy the more they seem to do things other than follow orders. This is not really a surprise, but it’s nice to see the research back up the gut feel.
Where I can find hard numbers for things I have used them to construct the 2D morale chart. In some ways this is sort of arbitrary, the numbers aren’t comprehensive enough to complete it. I’ve taken distance from the enemy as one axis and propensity to fight as the other axis. Probability isn’t as straightforwards as counting the squares, as I’ve chosen to use a 2d6 roll on this chart. This tends the answer towards 7 and I have used the probabilty of a given result (or greater) as the method for putting the shading on the boxes. Where certain conditions make something more or less likely the difference from the probability of 7 or more is what I’ve used to decide whether the die modifier would be +/- 1, 2 or 3 (most end up as +/-1).
I’ll post up more of this, along with some ideas on how I expect it to work, in a later post. Broadly though each glob of troops will have a marker on the chart showing their current morale state. Each time morale is tested they will roll 2d6 and modify. Scores of 6-8 (about 45%) will remain unchanged. scores of 9-11 will improve morale and 12 will improve it and move the unit closer to the enemy (except for defenders in prepared positions). Scores of 4 or 5 will decrease morale, a 2 or 3 will decrease morale and cause the soldiers to give ground back to cover.
Brains and Bullets is an excellent and very readable book which tries to put some hard numbers on a variety of psychological tactics that can be used to persuade your own troops to fight and the enemy to give up.
This is an excellent work on what happens in combat and why. It is very readable, structured into bite sized chunks on the key phenomena and then some joining up when it has all been explained. Each chapter opens with an account from a real soldier who experienced that psychological effect in combat. This is then analysed and explained, pulling in other examples as required to show that it isn’t an isolated incident but a general effect. Those examples range from the Napoleonic Wars right up to operations in Afghanistan, and they’re the products of proper scientific research not just a collection of war stories from unreliable sources.
That said there is no need to be an operational researcher, or scientist to understand the book. The language used is straightforward and direct, each of the concepts is very well explained and it forms an excellent introductory work as well as being well researched. The target audience is ordinary people without a technical or military background (although the author hopes that many military officers and civil servants will read it and think about it). Here’s my favourite line from the end of the book “if you are paid to be a military analyst, don’t forget that you work for the Crown (or the people) and for soldiers. You owe no allegiance to your cost centre manager. Crack on.”
If you do have a serious interest then it is worth saying that this isn’t fluffy pop psychology (I like those as light reading, having read Psychology at uni). All the conclusions are backed up with hard numbers from years of solid operational research. The author is hoping to influence army officers to use tactical psychology to make them more effective, so for example “even the hardest-fought flank attack seized ground with a smaller force, captured more of the enemy and caused fewer fatalities on both sides. flanking attack was six times more effective than a frontal attack.”
I’m not going to summarise this book like I did for the Stress of Battle, it’s way more available and affordable. Go buy it yourself (or borrow from the Library) and enjoy it. I certainly did.
This is a very well put together story of the Berlin spy tunnel, and some of the context that lead up to it being dug. It looks at the contemporary views and also re-evaluates the impact of the tunnel and whether or not it could be considered a success.
The tale is an interesting one, because the existence of the tunnel was betrayed to the Soviets before it was even dug. Blake took the minutes of meeting that decided to build it, and told his Soviet handler about it. Despite this the KGB didn’t share the information as they wanted to protect Blake as a source, so they couldn’t stop the tunnel until there was a reasonable excuse from another source. For two years the British and Americans taped all the traffic on the cables they’d tapped (it was a joint operation, but the US took the entire blame when it was discovered because Kruschev was on a state visit to the UK at the time).
At the time the tunnel was seen as a great US success, which was changed to a dramatic defeat when Blake finally got caught. There was a feeling that the KGB had used it for strategic deception. This belied the point that the purpose of the tunnel, as with all espionage at the time, was to ensure that there were no surprises leading to a nuclear war. In that respect it had succeeded, whether or not the KGB fed disinformation.
Looking back with fifty years of hindsight, the Cold War ended, and much of the intelligence declassified (at least on the US and Soviet parts if not by the British) it is clear that the information gained by the tunnel was real. The KGB were too scared of giving away Blake to be able to do anything to manage the information. It also took them some time to work out a way of finding the tunnel that wouldn’t lead to Blake as the source. It was only heavy rain and flooding that allowed them to arrange a systematic check along the cables for a damaged section. Once this was triggered there was still no guarantee the tunnel would be found as the KGB had deliberately not briefed anyone about what to look for.
I’ve written a short story called Hunting Nazis for the End of Module Assessment (EMA) for A215 Creative Writing. The target word count was 2,500 with an upper limit of +10%. The first draft weighed in at 5k words, double the target length. However some of this was because although I plotted it I needed to tell myself the story in the first draft. Once I got to the end it was much easier to re-edit and take out some of it.
Hunting Nazis
The central premise is that Reggie and Dot (from the earlier story Planting the Past) have been hunting nazis guilty of war crimes against the members of the French resistance and SOE agents supporting the network that they were both part of during World War Two. The story takes place in Berlin in 1953 when they are tying up the last few loose ends.
There are a couple of supporting characters, Paul, another ex-resistance fighter, but one that Dot (called Nancy by him as that was her code name) doesn’t trust, she’s convinced that he betrayed people to the Germans. He was arrested and deported to Berlin by the Gestapo as they left France in September 1944. Somehow he managed to survive this and the fall of Berlin to the Soviets and then establish a nightclub in a converted public air raid shelter near the Potsdamerplatz. One of his employees, a barman named Gustav is an ex-SS rifleman attached to the unit lead by SS Captain Hechte in the final days of the Reich. Reggie and Dot are looking to recover a relic stolen by Hechte and to confirm his death in May 1945 at the hands of the soviets.
There are also a couple of friendlies from their SOE days, still employed by British Intelligence but now spying on the soviets with the help of Paul and his nightclub. Their worry is that Reggie and Dot’s activities might scare off the Soviet officers they’ve been blackmailing if they are too blatant.
No spoilers, so that’s as much as I can say other than that it all comes to a climax in an abandoned bunker under the Soviet zone.
While this has lots of fascinating information about SOE Operations in France in WW2 it needs a better editor. The nature of the story, primarily of the secret operations in German occupied France in 1943 and the SD penetration of the SOE network, is one of many parallel threads and the uncovering of a mystery. So this makes it hard to just write a linear narrative, and the author has done a pretty good job of writing very readable prose that clearly explains what is going on. However there are a few places where the ordering of the material goes backwards within a few paragraphs and crucial pieces of information are given out of order.
The book shows an awful lot of research was done by the author, over a period of what seems to be years, and building on the work done by a number of predecessors. There is an academic level of referencing and footnotes. Â There are several distinct parts to the book. The first is a narrative on four women SOE agents killed by the nazis at Natzweiler, which then widens to encompass the others that were arrested around the same time and that shared their captivity in Fresnes and then Karlsruhe. Each of these women is identified and has their life story before joining SOE told. Where it is known this then leads up to how they were captured.
Another piece of the narrative are the attempts by others (initally Vera Atkins in 1945-6 and then Jean Overton Fuller) to find out what happened to the women after they were arrested. This then leads nicely into attempts to work out whether or not the women were betrayed, and if so by whom. There has been a lot of controversy about this, and many of the participants in the events have competing theories. Traitors in SOE, strategic deception and sacrifice by the British, french informers, poor operational security of the SOE agents, German counter-intelligence competence. Each of these is disected in turn, sometimes adding new perspectives to help rule them in/out.
Lastly there is some discussion of the post-war discoveries as the secrets kept for 20-30 years following the war started to come out. How the revelations around both Ultra intelligence and the British strategic deception plans changed how the events of 1943 are interpreted to modern eyes.
On a content basis this should be a five star book, it draws together all the earlier sources and is well written. However the structure lets it down, and makes it harder to assimilate. It reads like the collected notes of the author more than as a structured narrative.
